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1. INTRODUCTION
The health and viability of the world's fisheries have declined
dramatically over the past twenty years, and today most fisheries
are too close to collapse.' Overexploitation of world fisheries has
resulted from traditional international law that treated the oceans
as a commons, or mare liberum,2 and their fish as susceptible to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004; B.A., Williams
College, 1998. The author wishes to thank Professor Jason Johnston for teaching
the course that inspired this paper, Professor Harry N. Scheiber for assistance, the
members of this Journal, and R. Andrew Price.
1 See The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Part I - World Review of
Fisheries and Aquaculture, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") (2002)
(designating global fisheries in 2002 as forty-seven percent fully exploited, eight-
een percent overexploited, twenty-five percent moderately exploited or underex-
ploited, ten percent depleted or recovering), available at http://www.
fao.org/docrep/ 005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). The U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization has been called the "most authoritative statis-
tical source on the subject" of global fisheries populations. Christopher J. Carr &
Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for Managing
the World's Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 46 (2002).
2 HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS) 28 (James B. Scott
ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916) (1633). In the seventeenth century it
was generally thought that global fish resources were incapable of exhaustion by
humankind. One author notes that in 1885 the Canadian Minister of Agriculture
stated, "[u]nless the order of nature is overthrown, for centuries to come our fish-
eries will continue to be fertile." MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH
THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 32 (1997). Recent study suggests that even in the sev-
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ownership by capture, by anyone. In this international system of
open access to the world's marine fish, where no property rights to
fish or access rights to fisheries were assigned, competition flour-
ished and, with advances in fishing technology and effort after
World War II, 3 depletion resulted.4 Fisheries off Canada's eastern
coast were not exempt from this open-access economic system, and
competition among fishers there was particularly aggressive for
centuries because of the area's renowned productivity. 5 This pro-
ductivity has been so severely curtailed by fishing pressure that
Canada has declared full moratoria on fishing in the once re-
nowned northwest Atlantic cod fishery.6 Although depletion of
global fisheries had occurred before the twentieth century,7 its ex-
tent was not sufficient to spark widespread calls for a new interna-
tional legal order until the mid-twentieth century.8
enteenth century humans were disturbing marine ecosystems significantly. See
generally Jeremy B.C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of
Coastal Ecosystems, 293 Sci. 629 (2001) (concluding that ecological impacts of over-
fishing may not occur for decades to centuries after the overfishing).
3 See L.S. Parsons & J.S. Beckett, Fisheries Management in Canada: The Case of
Atlantic Groundfish, in GLOBAL TRENDS: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 73 (Ellen K. Pikitch
et al. eds., 1997) (describing "enormous build-up of [fishing] effort in the 1960s
and 1970s" around the world).
4 See generally S.M. Garcia & C. Newton, Current Situations, Trends, and Pros-
pects in World Capture Fisheries, in GLOBAL TRENDS: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 3 (Ellen
K. Pikitch et al. eds., 1997) (presenting data correlating collapses of various world
fisheries with increased fish catches in those fisheries, providing sound evidence
of causation).
5 See, e.g., KURLANSKY, supra note 2, at 9-21 (noting that Vikings traced the
North Atlantic cod distribution from Scandinavia to Canada over one thousand
years ago); William E. Schrank, The Newfoundland Fishery: Past, Present and Future,
in SUBSIDIES AND DEPLETION IN WORLD FISHERIES: CASE STUDIES 35, 37 (Scott Burns
ed., 1997) (noting that boats from England, France, Portugal, and Spain fished off
Canada's eastern coast hundreds of years ago).
6 See News Release, Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans Can., Cod Recovery,
NAFO Issues Dominate Minister's First Visit (Jan. 20, 2004) (documenting that
Canada's Minister of Fisheries and Oceans doubts Atlantic cod fisheries can be re-
opened during 2004), at http://www.nfl.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/publications/news-
presseNRNL0401.asp?Lang=English.
7 Garcia & Newton, supra note 4, at 37.
8 See STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-24 (1942) (describing an early significant attempt by na-
tions to reach an international agreement on the question of granting coastal states
more sovereignty over nearby fisheries to protect against incursions by fishing
vessels from distant states); Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Ex-
tended Jurisdiction to Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the
Marine Fisheries Debates, 1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 10, 15 (1998) ("With the




The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS")9 and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
("Fish Stocks Agreement") 10 are two of the primary advances in the
globalization of fishing standards that resulted from the crisis in
international fisheries resources over the past several decades. Al-
though UNCLOS may be ambiguous in certain details, it nonethe-
less marks a significant break from the previous doctrine of free-
dom of the seas by creating for coastal states Exclusive Economic
Zones ("EEZs") that extend two hundred miles into the ocean,
where coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction over living re-
sources." It represents a positive step toward the creation of an in-
ternational fishing regime where sustainability is achievable. The
Fish Stocks Agreement is a response to problems not sufficiently
resolved by UNCLOS. It creates fishing standards in those fisher-
ies that occur in both an EEZ and the adjacent high seas ("strad-
dling stocks") and those comprised of species that migrate between
different EEZs ("highly migratory stocks").12 Both agreements, as
well as a non-binding Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO")
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 13 provide Canada with
a regulatory structure within which to endeavor to reverse the
overfishing of its Atlantic fisheries by applying principles that
these documents articulate. Canada is currently reviewing its At-
lantic fisheries management policies 14 and should, within the con-
plomacy of ocean enclosures by the coastal states.").
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.
10 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conserva-
tion and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1542 (entered into force Dec. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement], available at http://www.un.org/Depts
/los/conventionagreements/texts/fish stocksagreement/CONF164_37.htm.
11 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 57 ("The exclusive economic zone shall not ex-
tend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.").
12 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, pt. I, art. 3; UNCLOS, supra note 9,
arts. 63,64 (defining "straddling stocks" and "highly migratory stocks").
13 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (1995) [hereinafter Code of Conduct], available at http://www.
fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
14 See DEP'T OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS CAN., ATLANTIC FISHERIES POLICY REVIEW
(2001) [hereinafter ATLANTIC FISHERIES POLICY REVIEW] (outlining process and
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text of new international fisheries law, focus on long-term sustain-
ability, resource conservation, ecosystem conservation, fishing fleet
downsizing, and precaution in developing new management poli-
cies.
This Comment seeks to show how UNCLOS and the Fish
Stocks Agreement provide useful and significant international
structure to what had been an unconstrained and unsustainably
operated industry, and to argue that they provide legal authority
and guiding principles that Canada can and should apply to suc-
cessfully reconstitute a sustainable and economically viable Atlan-
tic fishing industry. The Comment suggests that overfishing due
to both excessive Canadian fishing effort entirely within its own
EEZ, and fishing efforts of other states on the fringe of the Cana-
dian EEZ,15 can be controlled by principles embodied in the inter-
national legal agreements. Section 2 presents an overview of the
economics of the harvest of open-access natural resources and how
a "race to the bottom" is the logical result. It then briefly traces a
chronology of overfishing in Canada's Atlantic fisheries and the
regulatory tools Canada has employed to try to prevent the exploi-
tation that results from open-access economics. Section 3 explores
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement, as well as the FAO's
Code of Conduct and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organiza-
tion ("NAFO"). It analyzes how these agreements and entities in-
terrelate, identifies problems that are not sufficiently resolved, and
probes the guiding principles of fisheries management presented
under international law. Section 4 presents the legal framework of
fisheries management in Canada and suggests that domestic law
provides Canada's federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans
("DFO") with sufficient authority to effectively implement sound
policy. Section 5 examines how Canada can reconstitute its Atlan-
tic fisheries with management policies that embrace conservation,
precaution, fishing capacity reduction, accountability in the private
sector, and reduction of government subsidies to the industry.
goals of Canadian comprehensive review of fisheries management), available at
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/home e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
15 That is, overfishing of Canadian fisheries is a combined result of Canada's
excessive capture of fish within its Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"), and of ex-
cessive capture by foreign states fishing just outside of Canada's EEZ of fish that
swim into and out of the Canadian EEZ.
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2. THE ECONOMICS OF FISHING - How THESE ECONOMICS HAVE
IMPACTED CANADIAN ATLANTIC FISHERIES, AND THE TOOLS
CANADA HAS USED TO CONTROL THE IMPACTS
2.1. Economics of Open-Access Resources
Under traditional international law that predominated before
and into the twentieth century, world oceans were treated as
commons that were open to free use by all.' 6 In such an open-
access system, individual fishers have no incentive to maintain the
amount of fish they catch at a level that will ensure the fish stock
can regenerate itself to provide maximum future catch. The fisher
actually has an incentive to catch as many fish as possible, as
quickly as possible, because, even if catching so many fish under-
mines the ability of the fish stock to maintain its abundance, "if one
person does not capture it, another person will." 17 Global overfish-
ing did not occur earlier to the extent it has in the past few decades
because, even though fishers were all competing with each other
for the same finite amount of fish, they did not have the technology
to catch more than maximum sustainable yield.' 8 However, "[a]t
some point, the increase in catch made possible by technological
improvement will exceed the population's rate of growth. At the
new equilibrium, more effort will actually catch fewer fish because
of the resultant decline in the fish population." 19 The result is re-
source depletion and decreasing profit for fishers.
This open-access model should be contrasted with one of sole-
16 See, e.g., Donald McRae & Gordon Munro, Coastal State "Rights" Within the
200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 97, 98 (Philip A. Neher
ed., 1989) ("No state could claim a right to any guaranteed share of the living re-
sources of the oceans, but all states had the right to fish on the high seas.");
Scheiber & Carr, supra note 8, at 28 (noting the common property idea).
17 SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS
OF OVERFISHING 37 (1999). If one believes actors behave rationally, this statement
holds true. However, even if actors behave unpredictably, "it is enough that peo-
ple behave more or less 'as if' they are rational" for economic analysis premised
on rational behavior to be useful. Economic Focus: Behaviourists at the Gates,
ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 67 (referencing assertion as Milton Friedman's).
18 An anecdotal example of how technology limits fishing effort is found in a
description of how, until the 1930s, the traditional mode of catching cod was from
a small boat (a dory) that, when filled with a certain mass of cod, became unsea-
worthy. Fishers' catches were limited by vessel technology. KURLANSKY, supra
note 2, at 114.
19 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 52.
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ownership of the fish stock. 20 With a property right in the fish
stock, a fisher would have the fundamental right to exclude other
fishers from the fish stock, which figures prominently in the "bun-
dle" that constitutes property rights.21 With a right to exclude, the
owner would not face competition, would not have incentive to
use more fishing effort than the fishery could withstand, and could
fish the stock sustainably at a level that maximizes profit.22
Economic assistance in the form of government subsidies to the
fishing industry, both in Canada and throughout the world more
generally, is granted with an eye toward increasing economic de-
velopment, providing jobs, and ensuring food supplies. 23 Subsi-
dies tend to distort the way markets operate by, for example, en-
couraging more private investment than would otherwise occur,
encouraging fishing technology that increases fishing capacity be-
yond what fisheries can withstand, or reducing the price of fish
and thus encouraging their inefficient use. 24 Subsidies to a fishing
industry might take the form of direct income support, reduced
fishers' costs, reduce price of the use of capital, or generally fund-
ing of shipbuilding. 25 A relatively recent estimate of global fishing
subsidies quantifies their extent. 26 These data suggest the need for
significant reductions in the size of the global fishing fleet.
20 Id. at 53-54 ("Without the need to catch the fish before someone else does,
the sole owner would not have an incentive to use more fuel, gear, and labor than
necessary.").
21 E.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) ("The concept of property is often said to refer to a 'bundle
of rights' that may be exercised . . . principally the rights to possess the property,
to use the property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the prop-
erty .... ") (emphasis added).
22 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 53.
23 Id. at 59. These goals seem to be in tension with policies of protecting soci-
ety from depletion of public fishery resources.
24 Id. at 59-61.
25 Id. at 61.
26 Garcia & Newton, supra note 4, at 22. The authors calculate that the operat-
ing cost for the world's fleet is about $91 billion and that total costs, including
costs of capital and of servicing debt, are $116 billion, while noting the revenues of
the fleet are only $70 billion. Therefore, they conclude, the world's fleet would
have to shrink by twenty-five percent for revenues to match operating costs or by
fifty-three percent for revenues to meet total costs. Alternatively, costs could meet
revenues with an increase in the price of fish or a decrease in fishing costs. Thus,
subsidies contribute to this inefficient market.
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2.2. Impacts of Open Access on Canadian Fisheries
Canadian subsidization of its Atlantic fishing industry has con-
tributed to overexploitation.27 Beginning in the 1960s, Canada
funded the expansion and modernization of Atlantic fleets to com-
pete with growing pressure from European fishers. 28 Grants of as
much as thirty-five percent of fishing costs continued through the
1970s and 1980s so that by the late 1980s the fleet had five times the
catching power needed to capture the annual quota set by the
DFO.29 From 1972 to 1991, the Canadian federal government spent
about $ 4 billion dollars on the Atlantic fishing industry. 30
By 1990, Canada's Atlantic cod fishery was nearing collapse.31
In 1992, when the Minister of Fisheries announced a total ban on
commercial fishing in the cod fishery,32 he also announced the crea-
tion of a financial package 33 to supply payments to fishers and
plant workers. In 1994, the government announced another assis-
tance program: The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy. 34 This program
spent $1.9 billion over five years in income payments and fishing
license buybacks, but "the Canadian cod fleet remains much larger
than necessary to catch all that the Atlantic cod stocks can produce
over the long haul."
35
27 The discussion in this section is presented in significant part in IUDICELLO,
supra note 17, at 68-69.
28 Id. at 68.
29 Id.
30 Schrank, supra note 5, at 49; William E. Schrank et al., The Cost to Govern-
ment of Maintaining a Commercially Unviable Fishery: The Case of Newfoundland
1981/82 to 1990/91, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 357,362-63 (1995).
31 The true collapse played itself out over the 1990s and still persists. In 1990,
395,266 tons of cod were taken, and by 1993 the annual catch was reduced to
76,644 tons. In 2002, the Atlantic cod catch remained much lower than in the past,
at 35,718 tons. See STATISTICAL SERVICES, DEP'T OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS CAN.,
LANDINGS: SEAFISHERIES, ATLANTIC REGIONS-QUANTITIES (providing hyperlinks to
catch data for years 1990-2002), at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statist
ics/conmercial/landings/seafisheries/index-e.htm (last updated Dec. 8, 2003).
32 See Crosby Announces First Steps in Northern Cod (2J3KL) Recovery Plan, CAN.
NEWSWIRE, July 3, 1992 (reporting Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada's
("DFO") announcement on July 2 of both two-year moratorium on cod capture in
northern cod fishery and financial assistance package).
33 Id.
34 See News Release via Canada NewsWire, Ottawa 613-563-4465, CAN.
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 19, 1994 (reporting DFO's announcement of financial assistance
program to assist 30,000 displaced groundfishing industry workers).
35 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 69.
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2.3. Canadian Attempts to Limit Access
To attempt to manage fisheries sustainably, fishing effort must
somehow be limited, since infinite fishing effort imparted to a fi-
nite fishery causes total resource loss. There is a myriad of ways to
limit fishing effort and each presents its own advantages and
drawbacks. Effort might be reduced by limiting the number of
fishers allowed to work a fishery through a licensing program
where only a certain number of licenses are issued. A drawback to
such a scheme is that it does not prevent individual fishers from
increasing their effort, thus net fishing effort imparted to a fishery
may not change.3 6 Another drawback is that fairness issues attend
the issuance of licenses.
Fishing effort may be limited through seasonal restrictions,
which only permit fishing during certain times of the year. Under
such a system, however, fishers will have an incentive to increase
their effort during the fishing season, thus returning net effort to its
pre-restriction level. 37 Fishers may also be compelled to fish for
longer hours during the season, to the point of endangering them-
selves.38
Various restrictions on gear that fishers may use can limit ef-
fort. Such restrictions include limits on net size, mesh size, vessel
size, and line length that would all increase the cost of producing a
unit of return.39 Technical restrictions like these are inefficient by
definition. They may engender dangerous practices, and they may
be difficult and expensive to enforce.
Another method of limiting fishing effort is the use of fishing
quotas where a biologically-based total allowable catch ("TAC")
that sets the maximum catch allowed for species, areas, and times,
is imposed upon a fishery. 40 Two issues that arise with the use of
36 See Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based Fishing, in RIGHTS
BASED FISHING 11, 24 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989) (explaining that licensing as
a method of limiting fishing effort may induce excess investment in individual
fishing capital, preoccupation with racing and rivalry, and costly dependence on
public enforcement).
37 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 77-78.
38 See id. at 137 (describing halibut fishery in Alaska where fishing season was
limited to two twenty-four hour seasons and fishers recklessly and dangerously
raced for their catches).
39 See generally id. at 78-82 (discussing how gear restrictions and technology
limitations can limit fishing effort).
40 See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT




quotas are how the TAC is determined and who gets to fish for it.41
TAC is generally determined through biology -maximum sustain-
able yield should be equal to the TAC when the goal of manage-
ment is to maximize stock health. Allocation of the catch from a
quota system could be determined on a first-come, first-served ba-
sis-when the TAC for the fishery is announced, fishers race for
fish, and the fishery is closed when the TAC is reached. Another
quota approach is to determine a TAC and then allocate individual
quotas among fishers, 42 the sum of which quotas equals the TAC.
Individual quotas could be allocated to all fishers who want one,
with the allowance to each fisher determined by the number of
parties that want an individual quota, or they could be allocated
based on fishers' performances over an interval of time before the
quota system is implemented. However allocated, quotas could
also be made transferable so a market in individual transferable
quotas develops.43 The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") has found that individual quotas
have generally been effective in controlling overfishing and reduc-
ing fleet capacities. 44
Canada has employed all of these various methods45 to try to
MANAGEMENT OF LIVING MARINE RESOURcES (2003) (discussing how quotas operate
and noting their benefits), available at http://www.oecd.org/advanceSearch/
0%2C2661%2Cen_2649_346671111 1%2C00.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
41 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 82 (asserting that the two questions are how big
a catch should be and how the catch should be allocated).
42 See Scott, supra note 36, at 28 (noting that individual quotas have the poten-
tial to remove the incentives for fishers to race so long as TACs are certain, and
that fishers may have greater incentives to assist in enforcement because "possess-
ing individual catching rights makes a fisherman unsympathetic to poachers' ac-
tions").
43 See id. at 27 (noting that transferability of individual quotas is beneficial
because it can be used to reconcile fixed quotas with an uncertain TAC and be-
cause it eases the problem of catching unintended species since fishers have an
incentive to work out how to land the TAC proportions of different species). For
an example of the problem of unintended catch, see the discussion of nearly in-
visible gill nets that detach from their moorings and drift for years throughout the
oceans, snaring fish, in KURLANSKY, supra note 2, at 124. See also Ian N. Clark et al.,
The Development and Implementation of New Zealand's ITQ Management System, in
RIGHTS BASED FISHING 117, 133-35 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989) (noting the
benefits from transferability of quotas include minimizing real costs of taking any
given catch and maximizing benefit to a nation from any given catch while ensur-
ing a sustainable fishery and allowing fishers to exit and enter the fishery easily).
44 OECD, supra note 40.
45 Canada has experimented with virtually all available management
techniques: annual quotas, seasonal quotas, allocation by gear sector, re-
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limit fishing effort with varying results. The crash of the Atlantic
cod fishery by the early 1990s may not have resulted because the
then existent TAC system was flawed, but instead because the gov-
ernment was too aggressive in estimating a sustainable TAC.
46
Individual quotas were implemented in the 1980s and tested in
several Atlantic fisheries with varying success. Results indicate
that they have reduced the incentive to race and may foster "fleet
rationalization." 47 An individual quota system has also proven
successful in a particular Canadian Atlantic groundfish fishery
where quotas were allocated to fishers based on their prior catch
history.48  Individual quota management methods have also
proven reasonably successful in New Zealand
49 and Iceland.5 0
Canada continues to utilize a broad array of these techniques to
limit fishing effort, and should continue to do so, since these tech-
niques have proven reasonably effective. The ultimate hurdle Ca-
nadian regulators must clear is not that of discovering effort-
limiting tools that work better, but the requirement that, to attain
stricted fishing power of vessels, limitations on fishing gear type, limita-
tions on fishing gear amount, limitations on the gear specifications, re-
quirements for sorting grids, closing spawning areas, management based
on constant fishing mortality, ITQs [individual transferable quotas], stock
enhancement, restriction on vessel size, and strict vessel replacement
rules.
Parsons & Beckett, supra note 3, at 74.
46 See generally Schrank, supra note 5 (outlining repeated overestimations of
reasonable TAC by Canadian officials who faced pressure from fishing industry
during the 1980s). The aggressiveness with which sustainable management re-
gimes should operate is an issue that has given birth to the precautionary princi-
ple of environmental management discussed infra Section 3.
47 Parsons & Beckett, supra note 3, at 78 (noting that problems encountered
with quota systems included difficulties in ensuring compliance and misreporting
of catches). Fostering fleet rationalization means creating a sustainable level of
fishing effort.
48 IUDICELLO, supra note 17, at 110-14 (praising this management structure for
creating a workable monitoring system, generating incentive for fishers to reduce
bycatch [untargeted species that are discarded], and causing marked fleet down-
sizing).
49 See Clark et al., supra note 43, at 145 ("It is our view that the scheme can be
judged ... successful, and that it effectively addresses both the economic and bio-
logical aspects of fisheries management.").
50 See Ragnar Arnason, The Icelandic Individual Transferable Quota System: Mo-
tivation, Structure, and Performance, in GLOBAL TRENDS: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 225,
225 (Ellen K. Pikitch et al. eds., 1997) ("While a definitive study of the economic
impact of the ITQ [individual transferable quota] system is not available, the indi-




long term sustainability in the industry, effort must be drastically
reduced. Conservative or minor limitations on fishing effort will
not save the industry from its long-lasting depression.
3. INTERNATIONAL MARINE FISHING LAW
While implementing a fisheries management regime based on a
TAC or individual quota might work, its success depends upon the
government having the legal authority to impose such a system.
This Section describes the nature and extent of the legal authority
that coastal nations, like Canada, have to regulate coastal fishing.
In the early and middle twentieth century, coastal states' legal in-
terests in fisheries off their coasts, as compared to the interests of
foreign states in those same fisheries, were unclear. Growing con-
cern after World War II over the extent and nature of coastal states'
legal interests in adjacent coastal fisheries as against other states
led to the development of the Law of the Sea.
3.1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
In the early twentieth century, international legal tradition
held, generally51 that coastal states had complete sovereign juris-
diction over the oceans within three miles of the coast, but beyond
that boundary, the seas were open to all.5 2 As the century pro-
gressed, however, coastal states increasingly began to assert juris-
diction in the form of exclusive fishing zones farther from their
shores.53 President Truman issued an executive proclamation in
194554 which stated that when high seas fisheries had historically
been exploited by the United States, and additional entrants into
those fisheries might endanger them, the United States reserved
the right to subject all nations fishing in those fisheries to U.S.
51 Various governments over the course of earlier centuries had taken differ-
ent and evolving positions as to the extent seaward their claims of sovereign ju-
risdiction reached, but a general historical custom is discernible. For a general
discussion of international legal theory and state practices all over the world, see
RIESENFELD, supra note 8. See also ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 19 (1981) (noting that Argentina declared a ten-mile fishing zone
in 1907, Colombia set a twelve-mile zone for hydrocarbons and fishing in 1923,
and Mexico established a nine-mile zone of sovereignty in 1935).
52 Harry N. Scheiber, Introduction, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE
AND EMERGING CHALLENGES xi, xiii (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000).
53 Scheiber & Carr, supra note 8, at 41.
54 Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 3 C.F.R. 68 (Sept. 28, 1945).
2004]
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regulation and control. Latin American states responded with
their own extended offshore claims to jurisdiction, and a series of
events was put in motion that brought the issue of offshore juris-
diction to the United Nations for consideration.
55
The 1958 United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas5 6 represents the initial
achievement of the growing movement for international regulation
of the oceans. It was, however, very general and only provided
vague obligations to achieve optimum sustainable yield from fish-
eries.5 7 The continued assertions of jurisdiction farther seaward,
while opposed by industrial states like the United States and Can-
ada, who maintained fishing fleets that fished off these other na-
tions' shores, became so pervasive 8 that the United Nations finally
addressed the sovereignty issue directly by completing UNCLOS
in 1982.59
55 Scheiber & Carr, supra note 8, at 15. See generally HOLLICK, supra note 51, at
67-95 (detailing both the reaction of Latin American countries to the Truman Proc-
lamation and the events that precipitated the involvement of the United Nations
in creating international marine law).
56 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
57 See id. art. 2 (defining conservation in terms of securing food for human
consumption without setting sufficiently clear restrictions on potential exploita-
tion of the sea toward that end).
58 McRae & Munro, supra note 16, at 99 ("[B]y the time of [UNCLOS], exten-
sion of fisheries jurisdiction to at least twelve miles was an established practice
and the move to extend even further was well underway.").
59 UNCLOS, supra note 9. UNCLOS came into force on Nov. 16, 1994, upon
ratification by the sixtieth nation. Id. As of this writing, 144 states are party to the
Convention, including Canada. U.N. Div. of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea, Status of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter UNCLOS
Status], at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/ convention_
agreements.htm (last updated Mar. 2, 2004). Canada only recently (November 6,
2003) ratified UNCLOS. See News Release, Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans Can.,
Canada Ratifies United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Nov. 6, 2003)
(announcing ratification), at http:// www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/archive/nr-
c03_e.htm. Canada and other developed countries were not, or still are not,
parties to UNCLOS because of disagreement about a part of UNCLOS that
addresses rights in deep seabed mining. Of importance is that under international
law, the custom and internationally accepted practice is that non-party states that
declare a 200-mile zone of jurisdiction are treated as party to UNCLOS. Canada
asserted 200-mile jurisdiction in 1976 as an exclusive fishing zone, and thus its
recent ratification of UNCLOS probably does not change Canada's obligations
under international law to manage fisheries in its EEZ optimally. See Michael
Sean Sullivan, The Case in International Law for Canada's Extension of Fisheries
Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles, 28 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 203, 250, n. 12 (1997)
(explaining the motivation and incentives for the instatement of 200-mile
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/5
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UNCLOS allows coastal states to gain control over coastal fish-
eries by granting the states the right to exclude foreign fishing ves-
sels from a new geographic zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone
("EEZ").
UNCLOS grants to the coastal state within its EEZ (up to two-
hundred miles from shore), "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural re-
sources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil." 60 The extent of the
"true" sovereignty of these rights is evidenced by the imposition in
UNCLOS of certain obligations on the coastal state. The coastal
state is directed to determine TAC within its EEZ;61 to ensure that
the resource is not over-exploited;62 to maintain or restore fish
populations to "levels which can produce the maximum sustain-
able yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communi-
ties";63 to promote "optimum utilization of the living resources" in
the EEZ;64 and to grant access to other states where the coastal state
cannot harvest the TAC itself.65
To what extent is the EEZ assimilated to the sovereignty of the
coastal state, and to what extent is it nonetheless part of the high
seas under the open access tradition, given these obligations? It
may be important to note that no compulsory dispute mechanisms
exist in UNCLOS for disputes over a coastal state's Article 61 de-
termination of TAC within its EEZ or for a state's Article 62 deter-
mination of its capacity to harvest catch.66 Therefore, a coastal state
can, in practice, eliminate the occurrence of any surplus of fish to
which it must give other states access, largely negating any effect
of the Article 62 "obligation" to grant access.67 Further, even if a
jurisdiction). However, it seems likely that the recent ratification might reinforce
in the eyes of the international fisheries management community Canada's
commitment to long term fisheries sustainability.
60 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 56(1)(a).
61 Id. art. 61(1).
62 Id. art. 61(2).
63 Id. art. 61(3).
64 Id. art. 62(1).
65 Id. art. 62(2).
66 Id. art. 297(3).
67 See W.T. Burke, The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Ac-
cess to Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction, 63 OR. L. REV. 73, 90 (1984) (noting
that because compulsory dispute mechanisms for these disputes are absent, "giv-
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state does permit a surplus of fish to occur to which it will grant
other states access, the coastal state may charge fees and impose a
range of terms and conditions on such access. 68 These observations
suggest the EEZ is largely sovereign, and practice under UNCLOS
shows generally that most states view EEZs, which account for ap-
proximately thirty-six percent of the surface area of the oceans
69
and hold about eighty- to eighty-five percent of the fish landed,70
as under the close to exclusive control of the coastal state.
71 It
seems reasonable to conclude that no compulsory dispute mecha-
nism in UNCLOS applies to most disputes over fisheries manage-
ment decisions precisely because the international community in-
tended to grant close to exclusive sovereignty within EEZs.
The fisheries management obligations imposed by UNCLOS on
coastal states are sufficiently ambiguous, and perhaps even con-
tradictory, so that they cannot alone effectively ensure global main-
tenance of sustainable, economically viable fisheries.72 Perhaps the
most central tension apparent in UNCLOS is its mandate that
coastal states maintain fish populations at maximum sustainable
yield 73 - a concept embracing the principle of full biological utiliza-
tion of the resource without depletion-but that coastal states also
"promote the objective of optimum utilization." 74 The principle of
optimum utilization is generally understood to include economic,
social, and biological criteria.
[Miany people began to have misgivings about [maximum
sustainable yield], and about maximum economic return,
and started to speak of maximizing... sustained yield of
social benefits .... From all this sugary murk there crystal-
ing access is not a meaningful obligation on the part of the coastal state").
68 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 62. Article 62 is broadly written to give the
state substantial discretion in deciding what terms and conditions another state
must meet to access a surplus.
69 Lewis M. Alexander & Robert D. H odgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Eco-
nomic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569, 573 (1975) (providing a
table of geographic data).
70 Fishery Statistics: Capture Production, [1996] 82 Y.B. U.N. FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 87.
71 McRae & Munro, supra note 16, at 104.
72 See FAO, supra note 1 (presenting evidence that overfishing continues glob-
ally despite UNCLOS).
73 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 61(3).




lized, like fudge, the concept of optimum yield, in which
optimum is whatever you wish to call it.
75
It seems possible that the lack of truly definable and workable
limits to the concept of optimum utilization is why parties to
UNCLOS accepted the term. This central tension may be why sus-
tainability has too readily been abandoned as a management goal
in exchange for short-term development and job creation.
3.2. Fish Stocks Agreement
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS inadequately address how ju-
risdiction over straddling stocks76 and highly migratory stocks 77 is
determined. The only effect of these Articles is to require states to
cooperate directly or through regional management organiza-
tions78 in determining how the stocks should be managed, but in-
terested states are not required to reach a resolution. In the case of
a straddling stock, the primary concern is that management of that
stock within the EEZ could be undermined by fishing of that stock
where that fishing occurs beyond the boundary of the EEZ.
Canada faced this problem of the potential undermining of its
straddling stocks management in the early 1990s. Sections of the
northwest Atlantic cod fishery occurred beyond the jurisdictional
boundary of Canada's EEZ and these portions of the straddling
cod fishery were being fished very heavily by European Union
trawlers. Canada enacted federal legislation 79 that purported to
make it illegal for non-Canadian boats to fish this extra-EEZ por-
tion of the stock. Ultimately, Canadian officials fired at, inter-
cepted, boarded, and detained two different Spanish vessels that
fished these straddling stocks just beyond the Canadian EEZ.8
0
75 P.A. Larkin, Transactions of the American Fisheries Society: An Epitaph for the
Concept of Maximum Sustained Yield, 106 TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SoC'Y 1, 7-8
(1977).
76 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 63. These are stocks that co-occur in two or
more EEZs, or that co-occur in both at least one EEZ and the adjacent high seas.
77 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 64. These are stocks that migrate widely
throughout the high seas and EEZs.
78 These organizations are discussed infra Section 3.3.
79 Act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, ch. 14, 1994 S.C. 1
(Can.).
80 Anne Swardson, Canada Fires Warning Shots, Seizes Fishing Boat in Interna-
tional Waters, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at A25.
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Whether or not cases 81 for the legitimacy of Canada's assertion of
jurisdiction beyond 200 miles can be made based upon UNCLOS
Article 116(2)82 became clear after these incidents in which
UNCLOS did not adequately address jurisdictional and manage-
ment issues regarding straddling and migratory stocks.
The United Nations met the challenge of straddling stocks
management with the Fish Stocks Agreement. 83 This agreement
elaborates management principles contained in UNCLOS and pro-
vides new ones. It applies only to straddling or highly migratory
stocks84 and only to states that have expressly accepted it.85 The
Fish Stocks Agreement sets forth principles of conservation and
management in significant detail 86 including long-term sustainabil-
ity, precaution in the application of uncertain information (e.g.,
81 Compare Sullivan, supra note 59, with Yann-huei Song, The Canada-European
Union Turbot Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic: An Application of the Incident Ap-
proach, 28 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 269 (1997) (assessing the arguments for and
against the validity under international law of the Canadian legislation mentioned
supra note 79).
82 This article states that the freedom to fish on the high seas, outside of EEZs,
is subject to the "rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States pro-
vided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2 .... UNCLOS, supra note 9, art.
116.
83 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10. UNCLOS's major contribution, as
discussed supra Section 1, was the EEZ, which gives coastal states a tool to keep
foreign states out of a geographic zone so the coastal state can regulate its EEZ
fisheries domestically without interference. The Fish Stocks Agreement addresses
the harm to intra-EEZ fisheries that may be rendered where foreign states, al-
though not entering a domestic EEZ, fish heavily near its border for fish that enter
and exit the domestic EEZ. See discussion in the second half of Section 1 of this
Comment.
84 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3. Note that UNCLOS, supra
note 9, art. 61(4) already requires that associated and dependent species be taken
into consideration in developing management measures.
85 See William T. Burke, Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling
Stock Agreement, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING
CHALLENGES 105, 110 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000) (disputing the claim that the
Fish Stocks Agreement binds non-party states); accord Sullivan, supra note 59, at
247 (concluding that the Fish Stocks Agreement only binds states party to it). Cur-
rently thirty-two states are party to the agreement, including Canada, which
joined August 3, 1999. The Fish Stocks Agreement came into force on December
11, 2001. UNCLOS status, supra note 59. At least one commentator, however, ar-
gues that it came into force by May 2001, at the latest. See generally Andrew Serdy,
How Long has the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement Been in Force?, 34 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 29 (2003) (arguing that by May 2001, at the latest, the agreement
had received sufficient ratification to be in force).
86 The Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, provides more clarity compared




conservative determination of TACs), minimizing pollution, waste,
discards, and catch of non-target species, protecting biodiversity,
eliminating excess fleet capacity, collecting data and promoting
scientific research, and monitoring and enforcing effectively.
87
Part III of the Fish Stocks Agreement obligates coastal and high
seas fishing states that are parties to the Agreement to pursue co-
operation in good faith.88 Further, where a regional fisheries man-
agement organization exists that is competent to establish meas-
ures for a given stock, all party states must use that organization to
manage cooperatively (where no organization exists, party states
fishing the stocks must establish one). States fishing for straddling
or highly migratory stocks that are not members of such an organi-
zation must become members; otherwise they may not fish for the
stocks concerned. 8
9
The precautionary principle articulated in the Fish Stocks
Agreement is to be applied "widely to conservation, management
and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve
the marine environment." 90 "States shall be more cautious when
information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate." 91 How far
should this caution go? Inadequate caution has too often proven
that stock destruction can result, but too much precaution would
have negative economic and social consequences for communities
that rely on fishing.
The precautionary principle has been viewed mainly as a posi-
tive step in fisheries management. 92 The Fish Stocks Agreement
87 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, art. 5 (presenting these princi-
ples).
88 Id. art. 8(1)-(2).
89 Id. art. 8(3)-(4).
90 Id. art. 6(1).
91 Id. art. 6(2).
92 See, e.g., Harry Campbell et al., The Role of Research in Fisheries Management:
The Conservation of Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and the Exploitation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Southern Ocean, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 347, 364-65
(2000) (condoning precautionary principle when applied to findings of scientific
research); Joy Hyvarinen et al., The United Nations and Fisheries in 1998, 29 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 323, 328 (1998) (calling the articulation of the precautionary princi-
ple a major international achievement); David Vanderzwaag, The Precautionary
Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores, Rough Seas, and Rising
Normative Tides, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 165, 176 (2002) (noting that an overly
cautious embrace of the precautionary principle will not solve the global fisheries
crisis).
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further provides concrete measures for applying the approach in
specific contexts and makes clear that states, in applying the ap-
proach, can take into account socioeconomic considerations and
thus consider the costs of precaution. 93 Also, the "absence of ade-
quate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for post-
poning or failing to take conservation and management meas-
ures." 94 This statement seems to imply that the task under the
precautionary approach is to evaluate the overall uncertainty, in-
cluding the likelihood and severity of harm, potential alternatives,
and the cost of taking precautionary measures.95
3.3. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization ("NAFO")
NAFO was established in 1979 to manage the fishery resources
of the northwest Atlantic and to coordinate scientific fisheries re-
search.96 Each year it establishes TACs that are divided into quotas
allocated to its member states, 97 and it has established an enforce-
ment mechanism where NAFO inspectors can board member ves-
sels and check for quota compliance.98 NAFO is the sort of re-
gional management organization referred to in the Fish Stocks
Agreement 99 and UNCLOS100 that must be used to meet the obliga-
93 Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, Annex II.
94 Id. art. 6(2).
95 The relationship between scientific knowledge and government regulation
that is (purportedly) based upon it recently made headlines when pre-eminent
scientists asserted that the Bush administration distorts science in order to claim
its policies are supported by fact. The scientists were in essence arguing not that
regulators failed to sufficiently heed the precautionary approach, but that they
deliberately ignored it. See James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts
Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18 ("More than 60 influential scientists, includ-
ing 20 Nobel laureates, issued a statement yesterday asserting that the Bush ad-
ministration had systematically distorted scientific fact in the service of policy
goals on the environment, health, biomedical research and nuclear weaponry at
home and abroad.").
96 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, available at http://www.nafo.ca/about/MANDATE/
ConvIndex.html. Information about NAFO can be found at http://www.nafo.ca.
97 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization ("NAFO") has seventeen
member states. NAFO Contracting Parties, available at http://www.nafo.ca/
about/STRUCTURE/CPs.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
98 NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures ch. 4, NAFO/FC Doc. 04/1,
available at http://www.nafo.ca/activities/Fisheries/CEM /cem.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2004). NAFO also utilizes a satellite tracking system that continually
monitors its vessels and automatically reports their locations every two hours. Id.
art. 21.




tions to cooperate that these agreements impose.
The most significant obstacle to NAFO's comprehensive man-
agement of northwest Atlantic fisheries is the free-rider problem.1°1
This is the problem of non-NAFO states failing to follow NAFO
regulations 02 but nevertheless benefiting from the conservation
sacrifices made by member states and undermining NAFO conser-
vation goals. NAFO has addressed this problem by adopting a
scheme to encourage non-member compliance 03 under which any
non-member fishing in the regulatory area is presumed to be un-
dermining NAFO regulations. 0 4 It further provides that knowl-
edge of this event is to be shared with all NAFO members and if
the non-member vessel enters a port of a member state the member
may prohibit landing or transshipment of catch until the non-
member agrees to inspection. If inspection reveals the non-




100 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 61(2) ("As appropriate, the coastal State and
competent international organizations . .. shall cooperate to this end."); id. art.
61(5) ("Available scientific information ... shall be contributed and exchanged on
a regular basis through competent international organizations .... ").
101 See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 224-27, 231-32 (1988)
(highlighting the significance of the free-rider problem to regional fishery organi-
zations and noting this concern is what led Canada to the drastic actions de-
scribed in Swardson, supra note 80 and accompanying text).
102 Free-riders are currently within their right to disregard NAFO regulations
when fishing on the high seas under UNCLOS. See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art.
119 (reiterating that after UNCLOS non-EEZ high seas are still a commons).
103 Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Con-
servation and Enforcement Measures Established by NAFO, NAFO/GC Doc. 03/2
(2002), available at http://www.nafo.int/Activities/Fisheries/ gc03-02.pdf.
104 Id. para. 5.
105 Canada has recently embraced more fully this NAFO approach to the free-
rider problem. News Release, Dep't Fisheries and Oceans Can., Canada An-
nounces New Approach to Dealing with Foreign Vessels for Serious Violations of
NAFO Measures (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter September 27, 2002 News Release]
(noting that until recently, Canada only closed its ports to fleets from certain
states believed to violate NAFO management measures, but that now it will also
close its ports to individual vessels that are believed to have violated NAFO
measures), available at http:/ /www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/newsrel/2002/
hq-acll7_e.htm; see also News Release, Dep't Fisheries and Oceans Can., Canada
Cites Two EU Vessels for NAFO Violations (Sept. 19, 2003) (describing enforce-
ment proceedings against Portuguese vessels-bound by NAFO rules because
Portugal is part of the EU and the EU is party to NAFO- that took moratoria
fish), available at http://www.nfl.dfompo.gc.ca/publications/news_presseNRNL
0322.asp?Lang=English. To the extent that non-NAFO vessels that violate NAFO
measures require use of NAFO-state ports, this tightening of enforcement is a
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Another technique, which uses multilateral trade restrictions to
deter free-riding, has been employed by a different regional fishing
organization, the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas ("ICCAT"). Under this plan, ICCAT can recom-
mend to its member states that they should refuse to import tuna
from the suspected free-rider.10 6
These techniques for alleviating the free rider problem seem to
address but not wholly fix it. If non-members that undermine
NAFO were instead NAFO members, free-riding would be com-
pletely eliminated. However, it is difficult to see what incentive a
non-member that enjoys the fruits of the sacrifices made by mem-
bers has to join the organization (of course, under UNCLOS, Can-
ada can prevent any state, whether a member of NAFO or not,
from entering Canada's EEZ to fish). For now it seems that using
these techniques (trade restrictions and prohibitions on landings
and shipments) to discourage free-riding may be the best option.10 7
3.4. Food and Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries
The FAO has created a non-binding Code of Conduct for Re-
sponsible Fisheries 08 that addresses a wide range of fisheries is-
sues: fishing operations and fish capture, processing and trade,
scientific research, aquaculture, and the integration of fisheries
management with coastal management. The Code of Conduct
highlights the growing recognition 09 that effective fisheries man-
positive step. However, some ships might be able to deep-freeze catches at sea
and thus have no need to use nearby Canadian ports to offload and ship fish.
Nonetheless, the closing of ports would increase the cost to these free-riders; that
is, the riding would be incrementally less free. In the September 27, 2002 News
Release, the Minister also properly encourages other NAFO member states to
tighten enforcement similarly, since the more ports to which a violator is denied
access, the higher its costs.
106 Jean-Pierre P16, Responding to Non-Member Fishing in the Atlantic: The
ICCAT and NAFO Experiences, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND
EMERGING CHALLENGES 197, 200 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000).
107 Old-fashioned diplomacy may also work, but presumably it would be en-
hanced if it presents a workable incentive model to join a regional management
organization like NAFO. See News Release, Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans Can.,
Thibault Presses European Ministers to Address Overfishing (June 27, 2002) [here-
inafter June 27, 2002 News Release] (informing that DFO Minister Thibault
pressed European nations that undermine NAFO's management goals by free-
riding to join NAFO).
108 Code of Conduct, supra note 13.




agement that can produce long-term sustainability of the industry
must not only focus on direct fish protection,110 but also on indirect
protection through ecosystem management."' The Code of Con-
duct calls for the use of the best science available," 2 the precau-
tionary approach to fisheries management,113 an ecosystem-wide
view of fisheries, 114 and regional fisheries organizations. 115 The
Code of Conduct provides a useful model for fisheries managers,
and Canada has developed its own Code based on it.116
4. CANADA'S DOMESTIC MARINE FISHING LAW
Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act 117 establishes
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and its head, the Minister
of Fisheries and Oceans. The Act delegates to the Minister broad
authority to set policy and rules relating to coastal, inland, and
ocean fisheries.
The Oceans Act,"18 which came into effect in 1997, expands the
scope of DFO's mandate to integrate fisheries management with
the regulation of other ocean activities. The Act re-emphasizes the
importance of managing fisheries with the goal of sustainability of
the industry and embraces the precautionary principle of environ-
eries Governance, 33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 109, 118 (2002) (asserting that the Code
of Conduct embodies broad international consensus).
110 Code of Conduct, supra note 13, art. 6.3 ("States should prevent overfish-
ing and excess fishing capacity and should implement management measures to
ensure that fishing effort is commensurate with the productive capacity of the
fishery resources and their sustainable utilization.").
111 Id. arts. 6.1, 6.6, 6.8 (recommending conserving aquatic ecosystems, mini-
mizing impact on non-target species, and conserving and rehabilitating a wide
range of ecosystems).
112 Id. art. 6.4.
113 Id. arts. 6.5, 7.5 (outlining a precautionary approach similar to that found
in the Fish Stocks Agreement).
114 Id. arts. 6.2, 6.4, 6.6, 6.8, 7.2.2, 7.3.3.
115 Id. arts. 7.1.4-1.5.
116 The Canadian Code, when finalized, will be made binding on all fishery
participants and adherence to the code will be required of all vessels. Canadian
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing Operations (1998) [hereinafter Canadian
Code], available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/fish-man/code/
cccrfo-cccppre.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
117 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. F-15 (1985)
(Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca /en/F-15/47477.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2004).
118 Oceans Act, R.S.C., ch. 31 (1996) (Can.) [hereinafter Oceans Act], available
at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/O-2.4/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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mental management." 9 The Act also defines Canada's EEZ geo-
graphically, re-asserts jurisdiction within the EEZ consistent with
UNCLOS, 120 and outlines that the Minister of DFO is to lead the
development of a national strategy of management for all ocean
ecosystems under which Canada has sovereign jurisdiction.121 This
strategy, according to the Act, is to be guided by the principles of
sustainable development, integrated management, and precau-
tion.122
Critics of the Oceans Act argue that, although it may symbolize
a new conviction that fisheries must be managed with a view to en-
tire ocean ecosystems and long term sustainability, it is too cau-
tious to effect significant change. 123 Specifically, problems cited in-
clude the Act's treatment of the Minister of DFO as facilitator of
coordination between programs and policies affecting marine
regulation rather than the director,124 and the alleged insufficiently
developed concepts of the precautionary and ecosystem ap-
proaches to fisheries management. 25
Nonetheless, the Oceans Act clearly provides a statutory man-
date that Canada manage its fisheries in compliance with the eco-
system-wide and precautionary approaches, as required by inter-
national law. It seems to this author that the domestic Oceans Act
provides sufficiently broad authority to DFO to increasingly as-
sume a directorial, executive management role by ensuring that
departments and policies are complementary and that efforts are
coordinated. The text of the Act provides support for the conclu-
sion that Parliament's intent was for DFO to lead progressive re-
form of fisheries regulation,126 and intentions of legislators provide
119 Id. § 30.
120 Id. §§ 13-14 (defining EEZ as a 200-mile boundary and using the term
"sovereign rights" as in UNCLOS art. 56(1)(a)).
121 Id. §§ 29, 32.
122 Id. § 30 (defining sustainability as "development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs .... ").
123 Lawrence Juda, Changing National Approaches to Ocean Governance: The
United States, Canada, and Australia, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 161, 172 (2003).
124 See id. at 172-73 (noting that DFO Minister does not have power under the
Act to regulate ocean matters assigned by Parliament to other departments, and
thus fisheries regulation might remain too fragmented under the Act to promote
the sweeping changes to the fishing industry that are needed to reconstitute it).
125 Id.
126 See Oceans Act, supra note 118, pmbl. (embracing an ecosystem-wide ap-
proach to fisheries regulation; stating the desire to lead the world in fisheries
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statutes with meaning. That is, the Act gives DFO sufficient flexi-
bility and authority to lead Canadian fisheries managemen in
compliance with the mandates and principles of UNCLOS, t ish
Stocks Agreement, NAFO, and the FAO Code of Conduct.
5. How CANADA'S DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS CAN
ACHIEVE ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF ITS ATLANTIC FISHERIES
In 2001, Canada's DFO initiated a wide-ranging comprehensive
review of its Atlantic fisheries management policies with an eye
toward overhauling the existing management system. 27 In 2001,
the government began consulting with and gathering input from
fishing communities and the fishing industry but has not as of this
writing presented a new management policy. This Section dis-
cusses what policies and strategies Canada should embrace in light
of this Comment's prior analysis.
5.1. Ecosystem Approach
DFO should increase mindfulness of, and research into, ecosys-
tem-wide impacts of fishing. Specifically, its management has his-
torically focused on species-specific regulation without adequately
accounting for how different fish species interact in the larger eco-
system.128 The Oceans Act clearly mandates that DFO achieve sus-
tainable development and that it integrate ocean management be-
yond the specific industrial fishing context. Protecting the
ecosystem upon which fish stocks depend (e.g., food sources, wa-
ter quality, and species seemingly but not actually unrelated to tar-
get fish) will enhance the long term economic viability of the in-
dustry.
DFO must continue to cooperate with NAFO member states, as
it must under the Fish Stocks Agreement, and with states not party
regulation; specifically embracing precaution, conservation, and integrated man-
agement; and emphasizing the importance of cooperation between federal, pro-
vincial, and local governments-all of which are the fundamental principles ar-
ticulated in the international fisheries law that binds Canada).
127 ATLANTIc FISHERIES POLIcY REVIEW, supra note 14.
128 Recent work shows that populations of large predatory fish (billfish, like
marlin, sailfish, and swordfish) throughout the global open oceans have de-
creased by ninety percent from pre-industrial levels and that these decreases
probably have a negative ecosystem-wide impact on populations of other species,
like cod in the northwestern Atlantic. Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid
Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280, 282 (May 15,
2003).
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to NAFO to ensure that the single ecosystem that all these states
impact is preserved so fish stocks can be sustained. To accomplish
ecosystem conservation, Canada and NAFO need to continue to
support scientific, ecosystem-wide studies that bear on the biology
of fisheries.
5.2. Capacity Reduction
The fundamental problem with Canada's Atlantic fishing in-
dustry is overcapacity. Too many fishers have for too long been
dependent on a fishery that cannot support them. Low education
levels of many fishers have prevented them from finding adequate
alternative employment either in their communities or elsewhere
in the "mainstream" Canadian labor market. 129 The financial assis-
tance packages in the 1990s failed to reduce capacity significantly
because they allowed too many fishers to remain in the Atlantic
fishery.
The government and DFO should not continue to support eco-
nomically unviable fishing communities indefinitely and should
promote policies that foster significant abandonment of fishing
communities, and possibly migration away from them. The tradi-
tional Canadian Atlantic fishing community and its way of life
have exceeded their economic lifespans.130 DFO should therefore
taper off the subsidy programs that have maintained the industry's
excess capacity. The government could buy out fishers while mak-
ing clear that those who remain in the industry will not, in the fu-
ture, have government assistance. 131 The price at which the gov-
ernment buys out fishers could take into account their lost future
129 See Schrank, supra note 5, at 58-59.
130 By way of analogy, see Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United
States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). In that case, which arose where a
labor union sued a corporation to enjoin closings of steel plants based on a claim
of a community property right in a way of life, the court acknowledged that the
age of the economic success of steel production in the Midwest had come to an
end and denied the injunction. Id. at 1279-82. The court did not forestall the onset
of the Rustbelt age in the Midwest. See also Larissa MacFarquhar, The Populist: Mi-
chael Moore Can Make You Cry, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16 & 23, 2004, at 133, 138 (stating
that the American political activist Michael Moore thinks that "[i]f a company
wants to move a factory .. .the company should have to pay reparations to its
former employees").
131 While utilizing a quota system with a conservatively set TAC (consistent
with the precautionary principle) would reduce excess fishing capacity, a buyout
should precede transferable quota implementation. Quotas could then be used to




earnings, the value of equipment, the property fishers leave behind
as they migrate out of fishing communities, the cost of retraining
these individuals in other industries, the cost of unemployment
during this retraining interval, and the cost of moving. Industrial
downsizing and geographic displacement, although painful to fish-
ing industry workers, 32 are inevitable if the fishing industry is to
be efficient; 33 thus, the government should focus on easing the
pain of this transition rather than preventing it from occurring.134
It seems unfair for the majority of Canadians to support indefinitely
an outmoded way of life that cannot support itself.
5.3. Precautionary Approach
The precautionary approach to fisheries management, as de-
scribed and embraced by the Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO
Code of Conduct, and the Canadian Code, should be incorporated
into an integrated management structure. In the past, DFO has too
often treated the uncertainty135 of scientific information about fish
132 The pain of potential dislocation was recently made manifest when 250
crab fishermen in New Brunswick responded to a decrease in their quotas by
burning four fishing boats and a processing plant, and when cod fishermen set up
roadblocks in response to the imposition of fishing moratoria. See Clifford Krauss,
Canada Fishermen Protest Change in Government Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003,
Int'l, at 3 (including photograph of inverted Canadian flag bearing both graffiti of
swastikas and the name of DFO Minister Thibault as "Saddam Thibault"). These
are just two examples of numerous episodes of vehement protest that have oc-
curred over the past decade in eastern Canadian fishing communities.
133 By way of comparison, see Editorial, The Farmland Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2003, at A42, which describes the inevitability of the reduction in numbers of
farmers needed to produce crops due to technological advances in the agriculture
industry.
134 Investing money to buy out fishers, rather than subsidizing their out-
moded lifestyle, is more consistent with long term sustainability. Further, money
spent subsidizing excess capacity will be money wasted when, in the future, even
more money is spent to buy out the excess capacity. Canada needs to incur sig-
nificant expenses in the short term to dramatically reduce excess capacity; doing
so should ultimately save the government money.
135 See, e.g., Dying Cod Mystify Scientists, THE TORONTO SUN, Dec. 21, 2000, at
34 ("The number of young cod dying in waters off the coast of Nova Scotia has
doubled in the last 10 years, mystifying scientists who can't figure out what's
happening to the fragile stock."); DEPT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS CAN.,
BACKGROUNDER: WHY THE COD STOCKS HAVEN'T RECOVERED (Apr. 2003) (acknowl-
edging uncertainty and describing a list of the most likely factors contributing to
failure of cod stocks to recover), available at http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/media/back grou/2003/cod-3_e.htm (last updated Jan. 19, 2004). In-
formation about fish populations may also be uncertain since it not only comes
from direct scientific observation through the use of technology (fish-finders and
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stocks as a license to take too much risk by setting TACs higher
than fisheries can sustain. Applying precaution to scientific infor-
mation will increase the likelihood that fisheries remain economi-
cally viable over the long term, and TACs set under a regime ani-
mated by precaution should be lower than in the past where all
other conditions are equal. Since our understanding of ecological
interrelationships continues to increase, a cautious approach will
reduce the risk of overexploitation.
In applying this approach, policy should address the burden of
proof. Under the precautionary approach, the burden should be
on the industry to prove that contested regulations are inappropri-
ate rather than on managers to prove that regulations are required.
By erring on the side of conservative management, the chances for
economic sustainability of the fishery will be increased.
5.4. Cooperation with Communities, Industry, and Other States
The duty of cooperation embraced by the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment and the FAO Code of Conduct should be heeded. On an in-
ternational level, Canada's cooperation with other states through
NAFO is the only way for Canada to attempt to counter the im-
pacts non-NAFO states have on straddling stocks. By continuing
through NAFO participation to try to increase NAFO member-
ship 136 and enhance enforcement of NAFO rules, Canada can de-
crease the negative impacts other states have on stocks ecologically
tied to stocks within its EEZ (straddling and migratory stocks).
Cooperation with the fishers themselves can also contribute to
the viability of the fishery. By involving fishers in the develop-
ment of fisheries management policies, DFO will gain from the
fishers' knowledge of the stock and of the waters. Cooperation be-
tween DFO and fishers in management decisions could also in-
crease the respect fishers have for fishing rules, lending the rules
the like), but also, and primarily, from the reporting of catches. Therefore, man-
agers should also apply precaution in decisions based upon fishers' reports of
catch since fishers have incentives to underreport. See Reg Watson & Daniel
Pauly, Systematic Distortions in World Fisheries Catch Trends, 414 NATuRE 534 (2001)
(illustrating how misreporting is common and leads to mismanagement of fisher-
ies and inefficient investment).
136 See June 27, 2002 News Release, supra note 107 (reporting attempt by DFO
to get more states to join NAFO). Cooperation among states through NAFO can
decrease the catch underreporting problem by enhancing mechanisms for the en-





credibility137 and increasing enforcement. Further, where DFO co-
operates with fishers in deciding policy, DFO can then with en-
hanced justification and credibility make fishers more accountable
where fisheries are unsustainably operated.
5.5. Access
DFO should continue to manage fisheries under a TAC system
where TAC is determined with caution and should increase the use
of individual transferable quotas. In a fishing industry that has
been downsized to an economically viable scale, 138 remaining fish-
ers should participate in a quota market. Quotas should initially
be allocated based on past fishing results because that approach is
fair, and they should be tradable. Fishers who receive a quota
based upon past results would likely find the system reasonably
fair because they would be able to maintain a similar (or at least a
proportional) level of catch as in the past. A market in quotas will
ensure that the best fishers (most efficient) end up with more quo-
tas and that the worst (least efficient) sell them. Such a market
would ensure that the industry does not return to a state of over-
capitalization but rather remains lean. To the extent that a quota
system runs counter to the outdated ideology that there should be
no privatization in the right to harvest fish, that ideology must be
thoroughly rejected.
5.6. Diversification of Industry
To assist the industry in its transition from unsustainable and
overcapitalized to sustainable and efficient, DFO should promote
other sectors of the fishing and ocean economy. Tourism fishing,
and tourism generally in the coastal communities, could generate
employment for displaced fishing industry workers while ecologi-
cally impacting the fisheries only slightly. Shellfishing should also
be pursued to the extent that catches can be increased sustaina-
bly.139 Finally, aquaculture (fish-farming) might be embraced to
137 See Robert Costanza et al., Principles for Sustainable Governance of the
Oceans, 281 Sci. 198, 199 (1998) (suggesting that where decisions are made by
those whom they impact, rather than by distant authority, they will more fre-
quently and more completely be regarded and obeyed).
138 Supra Section 5.2.
139 See, e.g., News Release, Dep't of Fisheries and Oceans Can., Fishing
Industry has Another Banner Year in DFO's Maritimes Region (Dec. 10, 2003)
(describing how the Maritimes Region continues to harvest increased, and
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the extent that its impacts on the ocean ecosystem are minor and it
provides a viable substitute for wild fish.140
6. CONCLUSION
International fisheries law has undergone extraordinary change
over the past half century as concepts of free access to ocean fisher-
ies have given way to globalization of fishing regulation. As tech-
nology has advanced and fishing fleet capacity has increased,
many global fish populations have been devastated. Increases in
coastal state sovereignty under UNCLOS gave coastal states the
opportunity to manage fisheries sustainably, but Canada reacted to
its exclusivity of jurisdiction in its EEZ by subsidizing the expan-
sion and overcapitalization of its Atlantic fishing fleets instead of
implementing economically sustainable management policies. The
result has been severe depletion of its Atlantic fisheries. Also,
overfishing of stocks within the Canadian EEZ due to fishing pres-
sure exerted by foreign states taking highly migratory and strad-
dling stocks from waters adjacent to Canada's EEZ contributed
significantly to Atlantic fishery depletion. The Fish Stocks Agree-
ment and Canada's membership in NAFO provide a means for
Canada to reduce these harms to its fisheries caused by geographi-
cally adjacent foreign pressure.
In formulating a new management policy for Atlantic fisheries
that will ensure their economic vitality for the future, Canada must
address the overcapitalization problem by buying out the excess
capacity. In doing this, DFO must reject sentimental attachment to
the ideology of the freedom of the seas and to the way of life of
coastal fishing communities, while remaining mindful of the com-
munity hardship such downsizing causes and pursuing alterna-
tives to ease this hardship. A new management policy for the fish-
eries should embrace concepts of precaution so that fishery
decisions are not irrationally and recklessly aggressive. This policy
must also continue to enhance DFO's cooperation with other states
increasingly valuable, shellfish catches), available at http://www.mar.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/ communications/maritimes/news03e/NR-MAR-03-28E.html.
140 Farmed salmon in Europe and North and South America contains levels
of fourteen known or suspected carcinogenics or otherwise harmful contaminants
that are significantly elevated above the amounts of these contaminants found in
wild salmon, suggesting farmed fish might not provide a viable substitute to wild
fish in certain circumstances. See Ronald A. Hites et al., Global Assessment of Or-
ganic Contaminants in Farmed Salmon, 303 Sci. 226, 227 (2004).
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by way of NAFO and with fishers themselves, to ensure account-
ability and mindfulness of ecosystem-wide consequences of fish-
ing. A policy of cooperation where fishers are more accountable
will also enhance the likelihood that regulations will be followed
and enforced. Policies should grant access to fisheries under re-
gimes of cautiously determined TACs with individual transferable
quotas in order to prevent a return to overcapitalization of the fleet
and to ensure that access rights are distributed efficiently and
fairly.
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